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The relevance of the macro context for understanding political trust has been widely studied 
in recent decades, with increasing attention paid to micro-macro level interactive 
relationships. Most of these studies rely on theorising about evaluation based on the quality 
of representation, stressing that more-educated citizens are most trusting of politics in 
countries with the least corrupt public domains. In our internationally comparative study, we 
add to the micro-macro interactive approach by theorising and testing an additional way in 
which the national context is associated with individual-level political trust, namely 
evaluation based on substantive representation. The relevance of both types of evaluation is 
tested by modelling not only macro-level corruption, but also context indicators of the 
ideological stances of the governing cabinet (i.e., the level of its economic egalitarianism and 
cultural liberalism), and interacting these with individual-level education, economic 
egalitarianism and cultural liberalism, respectively. As we measure context characteristics 
separately from people‟s ideological preferences, we are able to dissect how the macro 
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three waves (2006, 2010, 2014) of the European Social Survey (68,294 respondents in 24 
European countries and 62 country-year combinations), enriched with country-level data 
derived from various sources, including the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, are used in the multi-
level regression analyses employed to test our hypotheses. We found support for the micro-
macro level interactions theorised by the evaluation based on the quality of representation 
approach (with higher levels of trust among more-educated citizens in less corrupt countries), 
as well as for evaluation based on substantive representation in relation to cultural issues 
(with higher levels of trust among more culturally liberal citizens in countries with more 
culturally liberal governing cabinets). Our findings indicate that the latter approach is at least 
equally relevant as the approach conventionally used to explain context differences in 
political trust. Finally, we conclude our study with a discussion of our findings and avenues 








The relevance of context for political trust has been widely assessed in recent decades (see, 
e.g., Dalton 1994; Catterberg & Moreno 2005). Recently, more attention has been paid to 
how context- and individual-level factors interact when it comes to explaining political trust. 
Studies adopting this micro-macro interactive approach have predominantly centred on 
theorising about how citizens evaluate the quality of political representation (see, e.g., 
Anderson & Singer 2008; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer & 
Hakhverdian 2017). According to this perspective, political trust follows the evaluation of 
procedural and policy performance of politics (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012). To test this 
thesis, scholars have focused on how the level of corruption interacts with an individual‟s 
level of education: as more-educated citizens are considered to be both better able to evaluate 
the functioning of politics and more strongly attached to democratic norms, the basic 
expectation is that the extent to which they trust politics depends on how free the political 
domain is from corruption (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer 
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We argue that the micro-macro interactive approach to political trust can be enriched 
by including another strand of evaluation, namely evaluation based on substantive 
representation, in addition to the more commonly assessed evaluation based on the quality of 
representation. Studies on ideological (in)congruence have found that citizens tend to display 
more political satisfaction when they feel substantively represented in the political domain 
(see, e.g., McLaren 2017; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). We build on this insight by 
examining the interactions between the micro-level economic and cultural preferences of 
individual citizens and macro-level measures of the ideological stances of the governing 
cabinet (i.e., the extent of the government‟s economic egalitarianism and cultural liberalism). 
This novel approach enables us to assess how the political trust of subpopulations is related to 
relevant context conditions, while answering our research question: how do evaluations based 
on the quality of representation and substantive representation shape political trust? 
 We answer this question by performing multi-level regression analyses on a dataset 
that includes waves 3 (2006), 5 (2010) and 7 (2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS). 
This is enriched with country-level data derived from various sources, including the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017). Our final dataset covers 24 
European countries and includes 62 country-year combinations and 68,294 valid 
observations. There are three ways in which our multi-level study adds to the literature on the 
micro-macro interactive approach to political trust. First, we assess whether micro-macro 
interactive relationships not only pertain to evaluation based on the quality of representation, 
but also to evaluation based on substantive representation. Second, in doing so, we are 
sensitive to different types of context characteristics: we model measures of both the 
economic and the cultural stances of the governing cabinet, in addition to the commonly used 
measure of national-level corruption. We examine how the former two interact with 
individual-level ideological preferences (for assessing evaluation based on substantive 
representation), and how the latter interacts with individual-level education (for assessing 
evaluation based on the quality of representation). Third, our analyses enable us to investigate 
whether and how context matters for different subgroups. 
In what follows, we first formulate our expectations for both forms of evaluation. 
Then, after discussing the operationalisation of our data, we test our hypotheses empirically. 
Our findings on the quality of representation approach reflect those reported in the extant 
literature: the effect of education on political trust depends on the level of corruption in a 
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individual-level ideological preferences on political trust depends on the stances of the 
governing cabinet in relation to cultural (but not economic) issues. More specifically, we find 
that the culturally liberal are sensitive to their government‟s cultural stances: they show more 
political trust in countries with a more culturally liberal governing cabinet. After establishing 
the robustness of our findings, we discuss their implications and present avenues for future 
research. 
 
EVALUATION BASED ON THE QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION AND 
SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION 
 
Evaluation based on the quality of representation plays a central role in the extant literature 
on the micro-macro interactive approach to political trust. It is argued that political trust 
results from examining the functioning of the political domain. Hakhverdian and Mayne 
(2012: 741) propose two sets of criteria based on which this evaluation takes place: ““input” 
or procedural performance and (…) “output” or policy performance”. The former refers to the 
fairness of rules and structures by which institutions and actors abide. For the latter it is 
essential to what extent governments “produce policies and services that are responsive to the 
general public”: “citizens will assess and react to the general performance of their respective 
country‟s political institutions” (idem). Public sector corruption is a standard indicator used 
for measuring such non-politicized quality of representation, as it is regarded “a major 
challenge to the performance of political institutions” in the interest of the general public 
(Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012: 742). Given their greater belief in democratic norms and 
principles (norms) and their greater knowledge of politics (accuracy), more-educated citizens 
allegedly have a greater stake in clean political domains and are assumed to be more accurate 
when evaluating the performance thereof (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; see also Dalton 
1994; Galston 2001). Indeed, it has been frequently demonstrated that, especially in countries 
with low levels of corruption, more-educated citizens report higher levels of trust in politics 
than their less-educated counterparts (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van der Meer 2010; Van 
der Meer & Hakhverdian 2017). Accordingly, we expect there to be a negative micro-macro 
interaction effect on political trust between education and corruption (hypothesis 1a). 
Research on evaluation based on the quality of representation has paid specific 
attention to how corruption is related to political trust of less- and more-educated citizens. 
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associated with corruption, and that more-educated citizens are, therefore, the prime drivers 
of variation in the education gap in political trust across countries with different levels of 
corruption (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian 
2017). As a consequence, we expect more-educated citizens to display more (less) political 
trust when the political domain is characterised by lower (higher) levels of corruption 
(hypothesis 1b). 
In addition to examinations of evaluation based on the quality of representation, there 
is an extensive body of literature on ideological (in)congruence. Instead of focusing on the 
quality of representation, these studies highlight the relevance of substantive representation 
for political trust: if citizens evaluate the extent to which their ideological preferences are in 
line with those of the people who represent them in national politics, they often experience 
them to be incongruent (cf., Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; Rosset et al. 2013; Schakel & 
Hakhverdian 2018). It has also been found that feeling represented nurtures political 
satisfaction and trust (Kim 2009; Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; McLaren 2017; Stecker & 
Tausendpfund 2016). McLaren (2017), for instance, showed that people are less trusting of 
politics if their own stances regarding immigration do not accord with those incorporated in 
the policy decisions of the government.  
In this study, we enrich the micro-macro debate on political trust by incorporating 
insights from studies on ideological (in)congruence and argue that, in addition to evaluation 
based on the quality of representation, evaluation based on substantive representation should 
be addressed in the micro-macro interactive approach of political trust. We do this by 
including contextual indicators of the ideological stances of the governing cabinet in our 
analyses and examining their interactions with corresponding individual-level ideological 
preferences. This interactive approach enables us to deviate from the common practice in 
previous studies on ideological (in)congruence, in which representation is commonly 
modelled as an individual-level characteristic (see, e.g., Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; Rosset 
et al. 2013; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). By distinguishing between economic and cultural 
aspects of both the ideological stances of the governing cabinet and individual-level 
ideological preferences, we explicitly extend our focus past the congruence of the traditional 
left-right axis (see, e.g., Huber & Powell 1994; Kim 2009; Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; 
Rosset et al. 2013), which has been shown to increase political satisfaction, but also paints an 
oversimplified picture of the ideological stances of the governing cabinet (cf., Hooghe et al. 
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First, citizens and political parties differ in the extent to which they favour economic 
redistribution: they may be more economically conservative or economically egalitarian 
(Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016; Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009). Following evaluation 
based on substantive representation, we expect a positive interaction effect on political trust 
between individual-level economic egalitarianism and the level of economic egalitarianism of 
the governing cabinet (hypothesis 2a). Our approach enables us to formulate and test 
expectations for different subgroups. On the one hand, the expectation may be that 
economically egalitarian citizens will report the highest (lowest) levels of political trust in 
countries where, and at times when, the governing cabinet is most (least) economically 
egalitarian. A study by Anderson and Singer (2008) hints at this by demonstrating that self-
reported leftists in particular are least satisfied with politics in contexts of high levels of 
income inequality (cf., Catterberg & Moreno 2005). Yet, the question remains as to whether 
citizens had their preferences regarding economic redistribution (instead of, e.g., cultural 
issues) in mind when reporting their position on a left-right scale. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis in our micro-macro interactive approach to politics requires further 
scrutiny: economic egalitarians in particular have more (less) trust when the governing 
cabinet is characterised by an overall higher (lower) level of economic egalitarianism 
(hypothesis 2b).  
On the other hand, it may be expected that economically conservative citizens will be 
particularly affected by the governing cabinet‟s economic stances. Tellingly, the affluent – 
generally the most economically conservative subpopulation (Van der Waal & De Koster 
2015) – have more political trust in countries with greater levels of income inequality 
(Catterberg & Moreno 2005; see, also, Rosset et al. 2013). Moreover, these countries are 
probably also those in which the governing cabinet has more economically conservative 
stances. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: economically conservative citizens in particular 
have less (more) trust when the governing cabinet is characterised by an overall higher 
(lower) level of economic egalitarianism (hypothesis 2c). 
Second, in addition to the extent of their economic egalitarianism, citizens and 
political parties differ in terms of how culturally liberal they are. A review of the literature 
leads to the identification of a diverse set of cultural preferences that are increasingly salient 
in both the political domain (see, e.g., Hooghe et al. 2002; Raines et al. 2017) and society-at-
large (see, e.g., Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009; Van der Waal et al. 2007). Following 
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pertaining to cultural diversity and the environment on the one hand, and traditional, 
authoritarian or nationalist (TAN) preferences on such issues on the other. Informed by 
evaluation based on substantive representation, we expect a positive interaction between 
individual-level cultural liberalism and cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet 
(hypothesis 3a). 
In formulating hypotheses for specific subgroups, it is relevant that cultural liberalism 
is not simply an ideological preference, but has become an identity marker of the higher strata 
in many Western societies (cf., Currid-Halkett 2017; DellaPosta et al. 2015; Noordzij et al., 
2019). This might mean that the degree of cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet is 
particularly relevant in driving the level of trust in politics among culturally liberal citizens. 
As a result, we hypothesise that: culturally liberal citizens in particular have more (less) trust 
when the governing cabinet is characterised by an overall higher (lower) level of cultural 
liberalism (hypothesis 3b). We are also able to formulate a contrasting expectation for the 
cultural conservatives. As cultural liberalism has been adopted by the upper strata as an 
identity marker, cultural conservatives experience stigmatisation when confronted with the 
lifestyles and attitudes of cultural liberals or, more generally, in culturally liberal contexts 
(cf., Jarness & Flemmen 2019; Noordzij et al. 2019; 2020). This is likely to make such 
environments even more frustrating for cultural conservatives than might be expected from 
disagreements over specific policies. We hypothesise that: culturally conservative citizens in 
particular have less (more) trust when the governing cabinet is characterised by an overall 
higher (lower) level of cultural liberalism (hypothesis 3c). 
 
METHOD, DATA AND OPERATIONALISATION 
 
Method and data 
 
Our data have a cross-classified structure (with individuals nested in both countries and 
years). We therefore used linear multi-level regression models, with individuals nested in 
country-years, nested in countries (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother 2016; Steenbergen & Jones 
2002). As the models that included year-level random effects did not converge, we 
incorporated fixed effects for these years using dummy variables, as suggested by Schmidt-
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On the contextual level, we measured corruption using the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (Transparency International 2020), which includes expert opinions on the level of 
corruption of a country‟s public sector. We employed the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 
(Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017) to measure the level of economic egalitarianism and 
cultural liberalism of a country‟s governing cabinet. The CHES is a well-known expert 
survey on parties‟ positions on various issues in numerous European countries. It is not clear 
whether experts had parties‟ discursive positions in mind when determining their scores, 
and/or parties‟ actions. Both, however, are indicative of parties‟ ideological stances. The 
Manifesto Project Database, meanwhile, which is also frequently used in studies on political 
representation, estimates ideological positions based on party manifestos instead of expert 
evaluations (Volkens et al. 2019). However, Adams et al. (2011: 375) found “no evidence 
that voters systematically update their perceptions of parties‟ Left-Right positions in response 
to the actual ideological statements that parties present in their manifestos”, but they did 
identify that perceived positions, instead of rhetoric in manifestos, shift voters‟ positions (cf., 
Backlund & Jungar 2019; Stecker & Tausendfund 2016). As a result, the goal of our research 
is a better fit with data available from the CHES. 
The variables we used to measure economic egalitarianism and cultural liberalism of 
governing cabinets were included in the CHES from 2006 onwards in four-yearly intervals. 
We therefore appended these macro-level to individual-level data from three waves (2006; 
2010; 2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS) (cf., Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016, who 
followed a similar procedure for their two-wave study). The ESS is a cross-national survey 
conducted every two years using face-to-face interviews. We weighted our analyses using a 
post-stratification weight, which corrects for faults in inclusion probabilities and sampling 
and for non-response errors. 
The macro-level control variables discussed below were derived from various 
sources. The World Bank Group (2020a; 2020b; 2020c) supplies data on economic growth, 
GDP per capita and unemployment rates. The Gallagher Index measures the 
disproportionality between the distribution of votes and the allocation of seats for each 
election (Gallagher 1991). Taken together, our dataset therefore covers 24 European 
countries
1
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Operationalisation of the main variables 
 
Our individual-level dependent variable is political trust. This is a reliable three-item scale 
(Cronbach‟s α=0.90 (2006); 0.92 (2010); 0.91 (2014); item homogeneity index H=0.76 
(2006); 0.81 (2010); 0.78 (2014)), and consists of trust in parliament, politicians and political 
parties, with higher scores on a range from (0) to (10) indicating more trust (see Figure A1 in 
the online appendix for the mean political trust values for each country-year combination 
included in our study). 
The main individual-level variable of interest for scrutinising the approach of 
evaluation based on the quality of representation is education, which we coded using the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The ISCED categories were 
collapsed to range from (0) less than lower secondary education, to (4) tertiary education 
completed. We excluded respondents from our main analyses who had not yet completed 
their education trajectory.
3
 On the country level, we measured corruption using the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2020) (cf., Van der Meer 2010). 
This measures public sector corruption, with lower values down to (0) indicating very 
untainted public sectors, while higher values up to (10) indicate that they are highly corrupt 
(see Figure A2 in the online appendix for the mean corruption values for each country for the 
three years included in our study). 
The main individual-level variables for testing for evaluation of substantive 
representation are economic egalitarianism (cf., Svallfors 2013) and ethnic tolerance (cf., 
Hooghe & De Vroome 2015; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). We measured the first of these 
using a question seeking people‟s views on whether their government should reduce 
differences in income levels. Higher scores on the scale ranging from (0) to (4) indicate that a 
respondent is more economically egalitarian. Second, we used the ethnic tolerance of the 
respondents as a proxy for their culturally liberal values. This is the aspect of cultural 
liberalism that can be measured best in our dataset, and is commonly considered to be 
indicative of a generalised level thereof (cf., Houtman 2001; Inglehart et al. 2008; see, also, 
Ojala 2015 and Vainio & Paloniemi 2011 on the relationship between environmentalist 
attitudes on the one hand and ethnic tolerance and other postmaterialist values on the other). 
We included ethnic tolerance by constructing a reliable five-item scale (Cronbach‟s α=0.86 
(2006); 0.88 (2010); 0.87 (2014); item homogeneity index H=0.61 (2006); 0.64 (2010); 0.62 
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towards ethnic diversity. Higher scores on the scale ranging from (0) to (3) indicate that a 
respondent is more ethnically tolerant.  
At the macro level, we measured economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet 
using information on the extent to which political parties (0) oppose or (10) favour economic 
redistribution. GAL-TAN was employed as an indicator of cultural liberalism of the 
governing cabinet (Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe et al. 2002; Polk et al. 2017). Also on a 0-10 
range, this distinguishes between the more authoritarian and traditional parties that prioritise 
stability and a strict socio-cultural order (TAN) and the more libertarian and postmaterialist 
parties, which are those that give precedence to personal freedom, democratic participation 
and progressive stances on issues such as euthanasia and same-sex marriage (GAL). We 
constructed separate measures of the levels of economic egalitarianism and cultural 
liberalism of the governing cabinet. We did this using weighted means of the governing 
parties‟ levels of support for, respectively, economic egalitarianism and cultural liberalism, 
because these, arguably, reflect the governing cabinet‟s ideological stances (cf., Huber & 
Powell 1994; Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). We calculated 
the relative weight of each governing party within a cabinet in a given country-year 
combination using their share of seats in parliament (see, e.g., Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; 
Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016), with the combined total amounting to 100%. Figures A3 and 
A4 in the online appendix present the values of economic egalitarianism and cultural 
liberalism of the governing cabinet, respectively, for each country-year combination. 
In order to capture evaluation of substantive representation, our analyses interacted 
individual-level preferences with context indicators of the stances of the governing cabinet. 
This approach differs from the common strategy employed in studies of ideological 
(in)congruence. The latter strategy typically uses a single variable that indicates the distance 
between the ideological preferences of individual respondents or the median citizen and those 
of governing parties, parliament or the median party (see, e.g., Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017; 
Rosset et al. 2013; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016; see, however, McLaren 2017). Our micro-
macro interactive approach enabled us to analyse whether, and how, context matters for the 
levels of political trust of different subgroups, which has thus far largely been overlooked 
because of the conventional modelling strategy. 
When it came to the economic egalitarianism and cultural liberalism of the governing 
cabinet, we took into account the fact that cross-sectional and longitudinal variations may 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
both the between and the group-mean centred within effects (i.e., the mean value for each 
country over its included years for the former and, for the latter, the mean differenced 
components of these variables, subtracting the abovementioned mean from the value of each 
country-year combination; cf., Bell & Jones 2015; Fairbrother 2014; Schmidt-Catran & 
Fairbrother 2016). Corruption hardly varies within the countries in the assessed time period, 
and we therefore only specified its between effect. 
 
Operationalisation of the control variables 
 
We controlled for various individual and country-year level variables used in studies of 
political trust and ideological (in)congruence. On the individual level, this included the 
respondents‟ economic circumstances as a way to account for the association between 
economic position and political trust. Income was operationalised as a respondent‟s total 
household income (cf., Van der Meer 2010), standardised within each country-year 
combination for reasons of comparability.
4
 Satisfaction with the present state of the economy 
(cf., Armingeon & Guthmann 2014; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; McLaren 2017; Stecker & 
Tausendpfund 2016) ranges from (0) to (10), with higher values indicating that a respondent 
is more satisfied. Unemployment (cf., Anderson & Singer 2008; Van der Meer & 
Hakhverdian 2017), meanwhile, measures whether someone (0) is or (1) is not in work. 
We also controlled for multiple socio-demographic factors, including age and age
2
 
divided by 1000 (cf., Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Van der Meer 2010) and whether a 
respondent (1) is or (0) is not female (cf., McLaren 2017; Schakel & Hakhverdian 2018; Van 
der Meer 2010; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). We also controlled for religious adherence 
(cf., Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian 2017) by asking whether a 
respondent (1) does or (0) does not belong to a religious denomination, and included 
attendance at religious services to control for religious participation (cf., Anderson & Singer 
2008; Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian 2017). The scores for the latter 
variable range from (1) never to (7) daily. We similarly controlled for household composition 
by asking about household size and whether a respondent (1) does or (0) does not have any 
children living at home (cf., Van der Meer 2010). We further controlled for being non-native 
by asking whether a respondent (1) does or (0) does not have at least one parent who was 
born abroad (cf., Van der Meer & Hakhverdian 2017). We included information about the 
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countryside; (2) in a country village; (3) in a town or small city; (4) in the suburbs or outskirts 
of a big city; or (5) in a big city (entered as dummies, as is common for studies using the 
ESS; cf., Acik 2013; Pichler 2010). 
We controlled for political interest (cf., Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016) using scores 
ranging from (1) to (4), with higher values indicating more interest. We also controlled for 
election winner-loser status (cf., Anderson & Guillory 1997; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; 
Kim 2009; Martini & Quaranta 2019; Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017), with dummies for 
whether the party voted for by a respondent (1) did or (2) did not become part of the 
government, or for cases where a respondent (3) did not vote at all. Lastly, we controlled for 
satisfaction with life overall (cf., McLaren 2017) and social trust (cf., Hahverdian & Mayne 
2012; Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016; Zmerli & Newton 2008), both of which relate 
positively to political satisfaction. The scores for satisfaction with life as a whole range from 
(0) to (10), with higher values indicating more satisfaction. Social trust, meanwhile, was 
measured with a reliable three-item scale that ranges from (0) to (10) (Cronbach‟s α=0.76 
(2006), 0.79 (2010), 0.76 (2014); item homogeneity index H=0.53 (2006); 0.57 (2010); 0.53 
(2014)), with higher values indicating that a respondent believes that others are generally to 
be trusted, fair and helpful. 
At the country-year level, we used data from the World Bank Group (2020a) to 
control for economic growth as an annual percentage of GDP per capita growth (cf., 
Anderson & Singer 2008; Van der Meer 2010). Higher scores indicate that a country‟s 
economy strengthened in a given year. GDP per capita was included to represent purchasing-
power parity in current international dollars divided by 1000 (cf., Anderson & Singer 2008; 
Van der Meer 2010). These data were also obtained from the World Bank Group (2020b). 
We also controlled for unemployment as the total percentage of the labour force (cf., 
Anderson & Singer 2008), again using World Bank Group (2020c) information.
5
 We 
included the Gallagher Index score for the disproportionality of the electoral system (cf., Van 
der Meer 2010), with higher values indicating a greater disproportionality between the 
distribution of votes and the allocation of seats (Gallagher 1991). Finally, we included a 
variable for whether a country is (1) Western or (0) Eastern European (cf., Anderson & 
Singer 2008). We did not make a distinction between the between- and within-effects for the 










Before turning to the multi-level models that we used to test our hypotheses, we will first 
provide insights into the contextual differences in the individual-level determinants of 
political trust for both types of evaluation. First, and relevant for evaluation based on the 
quality of representation, Figure 1 shows the regression coefficients of the association of 
education with political trust for each country-year combination (assessed in separate 
regression analyses that included all the individual-level variables). Generally, the largest 
positive educational gradients in political trust are found in Northwest European countries 
like Sweden and Denmark, while the largest negative ones are found in Eastern European 
countries like Slovakia and Slovenia. This is in line with the quality of representation 
approach: the more educated report higher levels of political trust than the less educated in 
countries with low levels of corruption, while the reverse holds for countries with high 
corruption scores (these scores are set out in Figure A2). 
 Figure 1 reveals that Switzerland is the odd one out: it scores rather low on 
corruption, while the less educated report higher levels of trust in politics than their more-
educated counterparts. This may be attributable to the country‟s semi-direct democratic 
political system, as various forms of direct democracy are reported to be most favoured by 
less-educated citizens (see, e.g., Coffé & Michels 2014). Figure 1 also identifies Slovakia as 
an outlier. Although the effect of education there is in line with the quality of representation 
approach, that effect is remarkably large when compared to other countries with relatively 
high corruption scores. We therefore performed a robustness check by running additional 
analyses that omitted Slovakia from the data (see below). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In a similar way to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows the regression coefficients of the effect 
of citizens‟ economic egalitarianism on political trust for each country-year combination 
(including all the individual-level variables). The general pattern it reveals is that it is only in 
a limited number of countries where the coefficients are in line with the substantive 
representation approach. This is, for instance, the case in Greece, which was governed by the 
centre-left party PASOK during the data collection and has a high score for economic 
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egalitarianism of the governing cabinet). However, for countries where high levels of 
economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet are roughly similar, such as Portugal and 
Poland, the negative coefficients of economic egalitarianism on political trust are not in line 
with evaluation based on substantive representation. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
In contrast, the regression coefficients of the effect of ethnic tolerance on political 
trust, which are set out in Figure 3 (again from models including all the individual-level 
variables), do reflect our theorising on evaluation based on substantive representation: the 
strongest positive effect of ethnic tolerance on political trust is identified in countries that are 
traditionally among those with the highest levels of cultural liberalism of the governing 
cabinet, such as Norway, Belgium and Finland. Less strong, and even reversed, effects of 
ethnic tolerance on political trust are found for countries like Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
It should be noted that Hungary‟s relatively modest mean score on cultural liberalism of the 
governing cabinet reflects the net result of: a rather high score of 6.17 in 2006 (in which the 
social-democratic party MSZP and the liberal party SzDsZ led the government); and low 
scores of 2.62 and 1.36 in 2010 and 2014, respectively, which was when Viktor Orbán‟s 
right-wing populist party, Fidesz, formed the government. 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Table 1 sets out the results of the linear multi-level regression models we used to test 
our hypotheses. Model 1 includes all the individual and country-level variables and the year 
dummies. Models 2, 3 and 4 each separately model our micro-macro interaction terms of 
interest: Model 2 - the interaction of education with corruption; Model 3 - the interactions 
between economic egalitarianism on the individual level and the between- and within-effects 
of economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet; and Model 4 - the interactions between 
ethnic tolerance on the individual level and the between- and within-effects of cultural 
liberalism of the governing cabinet. Lastly, Model 5 combines all the interaction terms that 










In terms of evaluation based on the quality of representation, our first expectation is 
that the positive educational gradient in political trust would be larger in less corrupt 
countries. This is corroborated by the substantially negative cross-level interaction between 
corruption and education portrayed in Model 2 (confirming hypothesis 1a). Brambor et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that an appropriate interpretation of an interaction effect calls for a 
visual representation instead of only a reliance on indications of statistical significance. We 
therefore plotted this interaction in Figure 4, which also enabled us to assess the subgroups to 
which corruption matters the most and in what way. In so doing, we did not maintain the 
covariates at fixed (mean) values, but instead calculated the average marginal effects (we did 
the same in the other post estimations reported below). Subsequently, we used the mlincom 
command in Long and Freese‟s (2014) Stata package SPost13 to separately assess the 
marginal differences between contexts for the less and more educated. In line with hypothesis 
1b pertaining to the quality of representation approach, we find that it is the most educated 
who drive the varying size of the education gap in political trust across countries that differ in 
relation to their level of corruption: their political trust is lowest (highest) in the most (least) 
corrupt countries (-0.93; p=0.039). In contrast, the least educated‟s levels of political trust is 
unrelated to the extent of corruption in their country. 
 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
Following evaluation based on substantive representation, it is our expectation that 
citizens will have more trust in politics if the ideological stances of the governing cabinet 
more closely match their ideological preferences. To test this, we modelled both the between- 
and within- interaction effects between: economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet 
and economic egalitarianism on the individual level (Model 3); and cultural liberalism of the 
governing cabinet and cultural liberalism on the individual level (Model 4). 
Model 3 does not provide support for our expectation regarding the interaction 
between individual-level economic egalitarianism and the macro-level cross-sectional and 
longitudinal differences in economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet (rejecting 
hypothesis 2a). Our results reveal a negative and unconditional between-effect of economic 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
were both generally less trusting of politics when the governing cabinet was characterised by 
higher levels of economic egalitarianism. Such a general, instead of a subgroup-specific, 
pattern is contrary to what the substantive representation approach predicts (rejecting 
hypotheses 2b and 2c). While such a pattern seems counterintuitive, it reflects previous 
findings by Van der Meer and Hakhverdian (2017), who found that people are more satisfied 
with the way democracy functions in countries that are more unequal in economic terms. 
Model 4 supports the evaluation based on substantive representation approach for 
both the cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in cultural liberalism of the governing 
cabinet. There are substantial and positive micro-macro interactions between the cultural 
liberalism of the governing cabinet and our individual-level measure thereof, namely ethnic 
tolerance (supporting hypothesis 3a). We visualised these interaction terms in Figure 5. First, 
the panel for cross-sectional differences in cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet reveals 
that the least ethnically tolerant report slightly, but significantly, higher levels of political 
trust in culturally liberal countries than in those that are culturally conservative (0.58; 
p=0.023; rejecting hypothesis 3c). Second, it is the most ethnically tolerant in particular who 
report higher levels of political trust in culturally liberal countries than in those that are 
culturally conservative (1.73; p=0.003; supporting hypothesis 3b). While the levels of 
political trust of both the ethnically tolerant and intolerant also differ across periods 
characterized by different levels of cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet, these 
longitudinal patterns are not statistically significant. 
 
[FIGURE 5 A HERE] 
[FIGURE 5 B HERE] 
 
For the sake of completeness, Model 5 portrays our simultaneous inclusion of the 
interaction terms for evaluation based on the quality of representation and substantive 
representation concerning cultural issues, for which significant micro-macro interactions 
were identified in Models 2 and 4. These effects are maintained when modelled 
simultaneously (supporting hypotheses 1a and 3a). Most striking, however, and at odds with 
hypothesis 1b, is the fact that if the tests for the quality of representation approach control for 
the substantive representation approach, we no longer find that the most educated report 
significantly lower levels of political trust in countries with high levels of corruption than in 
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hypothesis 3b, the most ethnically tolerant report higher levels of political trust in countries 
where the governing cabinet is characterised by high levels of cultural liberalism than in 
those where it is characterised by low levels (1.64; p=0.002). Model 5 thus indicates that, 
when modelled simultaneously, the relationship between the cultural stances of the governing 
cabinet and individual-level ethnic tolerance (i.e., the substantive representation approach) is 
at least equally relevant for understanding political trust as the relationship between 
corruption and education (i.e., the conventional quality of representation approach). 
However, caution is, of course, required when interpreting this finding, given the complexity 




We performed three additional analyses to test the robustness of our findings. First, we used a 
two-step approach as an alternative to our multi-level models, because assuming invariant 
coefficients for all our individual-level control variables across country-year combinations 
may affect the reliability of the effects of the contextual variables (cf., Heisig et al. 2017). In 
a first step, we conducted regression analyses for each country-year combination separately 
(including all the individual-level variables) and saved the coefficient estimates for each 
country-year combination of: 1) education; 2) economic egalitarianism; and 3) ethnic 
tolerance. In a second step, we assessed how the strength of these coefficients is related to 
contextual differences in 1) corruption; 2) economic egalitarianism of the governing cabinet; 
and 3) cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet, respectively. Figures A5 to A7 in the 
online appendix plot the results and include regression lines for each ESS wave. In line with 
our main analyses, we find stronger positive effects of education in the least corrupt 
countries, as well as overall stronger positive effects of ethnic tolerance in countries where 
the governing cabinet is characterised by greater cultural liberalism. 
Second, as the effect of education on political trust is remarkably strongly negative in 
Slovakia (see Figure 1), we ran additional analyses excluding this outlier (the results can be 
found in Table A5 in the online appendix). There are, however, no substantial differences to 
our main analyses. Nevertheless, future research could shed light on this remarkably strong 
negative effect of education on political trust in Slovakia. 
Lastly, the ESS data were generally collected in the final months of 2006, 2010 and 
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possible that acting cabinets – and thus our cultural liberalism scores – changed in the data 
collection period, which for reasons of consistency were coded as in office at the end of 2006, 
2010 and 2014. Table A6 in the online appendix contains the results of additional analyses 
that only included the 49 country-year combinations for which we were able to confirm that 
the data from the ESS and CHES were congruent (cf., Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). The 
only difference with our main analyses is that although Model 2 reports a significant 
interaction term between level of corruption and education, a closer look at the group-specific 
findings indicates that the most educated no longer report a significantly lower level of 
political trust in countries with high levels of corruption than in countries with low levels (-
0.81; p=0.065). 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Many studies have shown great interest in the relevance of context for understanding political 
trust in recent decades, with more attention paid lately to the interactions between micro- and 
macro-level factors. In this study, we went beyond the dominant focus on quality of 
representation, in which political trust follows from the evaluation of the quality of 
procedural and policy performance for the general public. This approach states that more-
educated citizens have a greater capacity to accurately evaluate the level of corruption of 
public institutions and attach more value to democratic norms. By borrowing insights from 
the literature on ideological (in)congruence, we developed an additional micro-macro 
interactive approach to political trust: evaluation based on substantive representation. Studies 
on ideological (in)congruence have found that citizens are more satisfied with politics when 
their ideological preferences are better represented. We built on these insights by interacting 
individual-level ideological preferences with corresponding macro-level measures of the 
economic and cultural stances of the governing cabinet (i.e., respectively, the level of 
economic egalitarianism and the level of cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet). This 
was in addition to the micro-macro interactions informed by the conventionally applied 
quality of representation approach. This allowed us to answer the question: how do 
evaluations based on the quality of representation and substantive representation shape 
political trust? 
 Our analyses first demonstrate that more-educated citizens report higher levels of 
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This is in line with the evaluation based on the quality of representation approach. Second, 
we found that culturally liberal citizens in particular report higher levels of political trust in 
countries where the governing cabinet is culturally liberal than in those where it is culturally 
conservative. This was predicted by our evaluation based on substantive representation 
approach. In cases where quality of representation and substantive representation concerning 
cultural issues were modelled simultaneously, the latter even seems to outperform the former. 
Caution is required when interpreting this finding, as we simultaneously modelled multiple 
cross-level interaction terms. Nevertheless, substantive representation on cultural issues 
seems at least equally relevant for understanding political trust as the quality of 
representation. 
In terms of the broader implications of our findings, our study demonstrates that it is 
the culturally liberal in particular who grant or withhold trust in politics based on the level of 
cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet. This is in contrast to dominant ideas on the 
drivers of political discontent (e.g., political distrust), which have predominantly focused on 
nationalism and authoritarianism among the „losers of globalisation‟ (see, e.g., Kriesi et al. 
2008). Future research could employ a micro-macro interactive approach to uncover whether, 
contrary to dominant ideas, the „cosmopolitan winners of globalisation‟ also drive contextual 
differences in political attitudes and behaviour related to political trust. 
Our findings may also have implications beyond the political domain. In addition to 
the well-established educational gradient in trust in politics, studies have, for instance, 
demonstrated education gaps in trust in judges and the judiciary (Bolton & Gardner 2014; 
Van Elsas 2015) and scientists (Achterberg et al. 2015; Gauchat 2012; Noordzij et al. 2019). 
Given the punitive views of the less educated (De Keijser et al. 2007; Falco & Martin 2002) 
and their low levels of environmental concern (Kvaløy et al. 2012; McCright et al. 2015), our 
evaluation based on substantive representation approach might provide an explanation: the 
education gap in trust in judges and scientists may reflect the high (low) trust of those who 
(do not) feel culturally represented by them.  
Lastly, Anderson and Guillory (1997) found that electoral losers are relatively more 
satisfied with democracy in consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies, 
arguably because they are better represented therein (cf., Martini & Quaranta 2019). A 
fruitful venture for studies building on both our findings and those of Anderson and Guillory 
(1997) would be to identify whether the political trust of electoral losers varies by the extent 
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consensual systems, we expect this to also be the case when they have a similar ideology to 
the government, even if they did not vote it into office.  
Our study provides multiple directions for future research. One is a closer scrutiny of 
the relationship between shifts in stances of governing cabinets over time and political trust. 
Whereas culturally liberal citizens living in countries with a more culturally liberal governing 
cabinet report higher levels of political trust, their level of political trust does not associate 
with longitudinal changes in the cultural liberalism of governing cabinets in the period we 
studied (2006-2014). Future research could shed light on this null finding through inductive 
in-depth case studies, for which countries with the most marked shifts in the cultural stances 
of the governing cabinet – e.g., Hungary, Poland and Spain – could provide strategic cases. 
These studies could provide empirically grounded insights into the dynamics brought about 
by substantial shifts in government stances and their relevance for the political trust of 
different subgroups. 
 Future studies could, in addition, build on our study with particular regards to two 
limitations. First, our study leaves unanswered whether measuring ideological stances of 
government parties using the CHES captures discursive positions of these parties, their 
actions, or both. Future research could strive towards including separate measures for both 
aspects in order to assess the extent to which each of these matters for the impact of 
governments‟ stances on political trust among different subgroups. Second, future studies 
could build on our research by assessing whether there is a causal link between substantive 
representation and political trust. As the pooled cross-sectional correlational data used for this 
study do not allow such causal inferences, follow-up research using panel data or (survey) 
experiments would be worthwhile. 
Nevertheless, for now, we feel safe in concluding that, in addition to the commonly 
assessed evaluation based on the quality of representation, evaluation based on substantive 
representation has merits when it comes to the micro-macro debate on political trust. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that a stronger focus on the culturally liberal seems to be 
warranted when it comes to understanding context differences in political trust. Such a focus 
might also make a valuable contribution to dominant ideas on country and period differences 
in all kinds of political distrust-related discontent, as these often rely heavily on the cultural 











 Included are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG) (missing in 2014), Croatia (HR) 
(only included in 2010), the Czech Republic (CZ) (missing in 2006), Denmark (DK), Estonia 
(EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL) (only included in 2010), 
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Lithuania (LT) (missing in 2006), the Netherlands (NL), Norway 
(NO) (missing in 2006), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK) (missing in 2014), 
Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH) (missing in 2006) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). 
2
 Online Appendix Table A1 presents an overview of the countries that are included in the 
analyses and the response rate of each country for each year. Online Appendix Table A2 
contains the descriptive statistics, while Online Appendix Table A3 has additional details on 
items, coding and factor analyses for all the multi-item measures. Online Appendix Table A4 
sets out the Mokken-scale analyses for all the multi-item measures. 
3 
We also ran our analyses by including those who are still studying (coded according to the 
highest level of education completed). This did not affect our main conclusions (Table A7 
reports the full results). We therefore decided to present our analyses by excluding those who 
have not completed their educational trajectory. 
4
 After standardisation, the minimum score is -3.36 and the maximum 5.83. As this broad 
range possibly poses an outlier problem, we ran the analyses both with and without 
observations with a value of more than 4 (0.02% of all respondents). As this did not affect the 
main conclusions, we decided not to delete these observations from our main analyses. 
5
 Respondents were categorised as unemployed when they were “without work, seeking work 
in a recent past period and currently available for work, including people who have lost their 
jobs or who have voluntarily left work” (World Bank Group 2020c, details section). This 
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TABLE AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Linear multi-level regression models for political trust. 





Individual level      
Education -0.01 0.09** -0.01 -0.01 0.07* 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Economic egalitarianism -0.03* -0.03* -0.15* -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic tolerance 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** -0.07 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.16) 
Country(-year) level      
Corruption (Mean) -0.10 -0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Economic egalitarianism of the governing 
cabinet (Mean) 
-0.32*** -0.29*** -0.40*** -0.30*** -0.29*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Economic egalitarianism of the governing 
cabinet (Diff.) 
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet 
(Mean) 
0.24*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.13* 0.12* 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet 
(Diff.) 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Micro-macro interactions      
Quality of representation      
Corruption (Mean) x Education  -0.04***   -0.03** 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
      
Substantive representation (Economic egalitarianism)    
Economic egalitarianism of the governing 
cabinet (Mean) x Economic egalitarianism 
  0.03   
  (0.02)   
Economic egalitarianism of the governing 
cabinet (Diff.) x Economic egalitarianism 
  0.00   
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Substantive representation (Cultural liberalism)    
Cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet 
(Mean) x Ethnic tolerance 
   0.09* 0.08* 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet 
(Diff.) x Ethnic tolerance 
   0.04*** 0.04*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Individual-level controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year level controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Intercept 0.85 0.14 1.20 0.67 0.25 
 (0.60) (0.67) (0.63) (0.68) (0.81) 
      
Variance (Individual) 2.73 2.71 2.73 2.71 2.70 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Variance (Country-year) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Variance (Country) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Slope (Education)  0.01   0.01 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
Slope (Ethnic tolerance)    0.04 0.03 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
      
n (individual level) 68,294 68,294 68,294 68,294 68,294 
n (country-year level) 62 62 62 62 62 
n (country level) 24 24 24 24 24 
Sources: ESS, waves 3 (2006), 5 (2010) and 7 (2014); CHES (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017); 
World Bank Group (2020a; 2020b; 2020c); Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 
2020); and Gallagher Index (Gallagher 1991). 
Note: * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001. Unstandardised coefficients; standard errors in 
parentheses. Full model available upon request. 
a 
The model did not converge when specifying a random slope for economic egalitarianism on the 
individual level. The variance of the random slope for economic egalitarianism (in a non-converged 
model) is very close to 0. Although Heisig and Scheffer (2019) state that individual-level random 
slopes must be included for cross-level interactions in multi-level models, they nevertheless illustrate 
that, in this specific circumstance, they can be omitted. As a result, we did not specify a random slope 
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Figure 1. The effect of education on political trust per country and year (regression coefficients 
derived from the analyses that include all the individual-level variables). 
 
Figure 2. The effect of economic egalitarianism on political trust per country and year (regression 
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Figure 3. The effect of ethnic tolerance on political trust per country and year (regression coefficients 
derived from the analyses that include all the individual-level variables). 
 
Figure 4. Predicted level of political trust for the more and less educated across different levels of 
corruption, along with the 95% confidence intervals (Table 1, Model 2). The difference in political 
trust between the countries with the lowest and highest levels of corruption is significant for the 
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Figure 5. Predicted level of political trust for the most and least ethnically tolerant across different 
levels of cultural liberalism of the governing cabinet, along with the 95% confidence intervals (Table 
1, Model 4). In cases of cross-sectional differences (upper panel), the level of political trust of the 
most ethnically tolerant is higher in the most culturally liberal countries than in the least (1.73; 
p=0.003). The same applies to the least ethnically tolerant, but less so (0.58; p=0.023). In cases of 
longitudinal differences (lower panel), the level of political trust of both the most and least ethnically 
tolerant does not differ significantly between the most and least culturally liberal contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
